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SUBIPOENAS AND PIR1EVACY
C/lristoplier Slohogin
I NTROI)t TION
In its efforts to enforce the law and investigate crime, the govern-
ment routinely seeks access to records and other documents. The pri-
mary mechanism for acquiring these materials is the subpoena, a
formal demand for tangible items. No nationwide tally of the extent
to which law enforcement uses document subpoenas exists. But the
federal government alone issues thousands of such subpoenas every
year.' Thus, as an investigative tool, subpoenas are probably more
important than physical searches of homes, businesses, and effects.
Yet very little literature on the history or rationale of the subpoena
exists. This Article seeks to help fill that void.
There are two types of investigative document subpoenas. Subpoe-
nas duces tecunm are controlled by the grand jury or the prosecutor.
with the courts determining their validity when they are resisted by
the target. 2 Administrative subpoenas or summons are issued by gov-
ernment agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service. the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice. and are also en-
forced by the courts)
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor or Las, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of
Law. This Article is based on a presentation given at DePaul Utversitv College of Law on
March. 13. 20(4. at the Symposiurn: Privacv and Ideiit,: Construcing, Maintaining, atd Protect-
ing Personhood. The author would like to thank Jerold Israel. Scott Sundbv. Peter Swire,
George Thomas. and participants at workshops at Florida State University Law School. The
Ohio State University Moritz Law School. Hastings Law School, and Mississippi Law School for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Any errors are mine alone.
1. See infira notes 175-185 and accompanying text. See also Samuel A. Alito. Jr.. Docunients
and the Privilege Against SellhIncriniination. 48 U. Pr I. L. RFrv. 27. 31 (1986) (stating that -sub-
poenas and summonses for documents have become a staple of investigations regarding every
variety of sophisticated criminal activity. from violations of regulator' provisions to political
corruption and large-scale drug dealing").
2. Although as a formal matter, the grand jury normall' issues the subpoena. in only a small
number of states does the grand jury actually control the subpoena power: in most it is exercised
by the prosecutor. SARA St'N Bi-AI. I I A.. I GRANO ,t R) LA%\ ANIt PRA It-J- § 6:2 (2d ed.
2004).
3. See generally ,lAS A. Si I FIN I l . 3 ADtI t\ SiI RA I I Lssw' § 21).)4 (2002) (describing
administrative agencies' extensive power to lake testinmoV under oath. inspect records and
documents, and require the submission of reports" (quoting Donovan v. Shaw, 668 F.2d 985 (8th
Cir. 1982))).
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Although both types of subpoenas can be challenged by the recipi-
ent before any documents are handed over,4 both are also extremely
easy to enforce. There are essentially three grounds for resisting a
subpoena: privilege, burdensomeness, and irrelevance. A successful
privilege claim is rare; as explained in some detail in this Article, the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is usually un-
available and the attorney-client privilege is coextensive with that
privilege. Objections that the task of assembling the records de-
manded by a subpoena is too burdensome or expensive also "are al-
most always doomed to failure."' 5 And an irrelevance challenge is
usually equally unavailing. In the federal grand jury context, for in-
stance, subpoenas are quashed as irrelevant only when "there is no
reasonable possibility that the category of materials the government
seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the
grand jury's investigation."6 The relevancy standard in the adminis-
trative subpoena context is similarly lax. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that constitutional requisites are met even when a subpoena
seeks to satisfy "nothing more than official curiosity," 7 and some
lower courts have concluded that the standard is even more deferen-
tial than the "arbitrary and capricious" test applied in administrative
law cases.8
Yet, as I have detailed elsewhere, 9 today subpoenas and pseudo-
subpoenas'0 are routinely used not only to obtain business records
4. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-21 (stating that, with respect to grand juries, "the
subpoenaed party has an opportunity to seek judicial review in order to raise any objections to
the legality of the subpoena and to assert any privileges that may be applicable"); STEIN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 21-24 (noting that, in federal administrative cases, motions to quash must be
brought before the agency, which then must apply to federal court for enforcement).
5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135 (2d ed. 1999).
6. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292. 301 (1991). For a general discussion of
the extremely minimal showing of materiality required for grand jury subpoenas duces tecum,
see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5. at 134 (noting that "[c]ourts generally give grand juries consid-
erable leeway in judging relevancy"): id. at 146-54 (describing Supreme Court and lower court
case law suggesting that irrelevance, independent of overbreadth, is not a ground for finding a
subpoena invalid under the Fourth Amendment).
7. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632. 652 (1950). See also United States v. Pow-
ell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (requiring only that an administrative subpoena be issued for a
"legitimate purpose").
8. See United States v. Hunton & Williams, 952 F. Supp. 843, 854 (D.D.C. 1995). See STEIN El
AL., supra note 3, at 20-59 (stating that lower courts have held "that subpoenas will be enforced
as to any documents that 'are not plainly immaterial or irrelevant to the investigation"' (quoting
Donovan v. Shaw, 668 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1982))).
9. Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss. L.J. (forthcom-
ing Fall 2005) (page number references are to an unpublished draft on file with the DePaul Law
Review).
10. Certain types of transaction surveillance may be authorized via "ex parte subpoenas"(subpoenas that may be challenged only by the third-party recordholder, not the subject of the
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and the like, but also documents containing significant amounts of
personal information about individuals, information that can be ex-
tremely revealing. For instance, a subpoena is all the federal govern-
ment needs to obtain medical, financial, and school records." The
contents of "stored" e-mail messages and phone company and In-
ternet Service Provider logs can also be acquired pursuant to a sub-
poena.' 2 And other types of information-ranging from the phone
numbers and e-mail addresses one contacts, to the contents of records
kept by government agencies-can be obtained simply upon the certi-
fication of a law enforcement official that the information will be use-
ful to a government investigation.
13
From a privacy perspective, this state of affairs is, at the least, puz-
zling. Under the Fourth Amendment, which is meant to protect "rea-
sonable expectations of privacy," 14 the government usually needs
probable cause-akin to a more-likely-than-not standard-to search
"houses, persons, papers and effects."'1 5 Yet the government can ob-
tain many types of "papers" containing personal, private information
on a far lesser showing.
records); "certification orders" (orders that must be issued by the court if law enforcement certi-
fies the information sought is relevant); and "extrajudicial certifications" (letters from law en-
forcement officials certifying the relevance of the sought-after records). See id. at 32.
11. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2004) (authorizing subpoenas for medical records under the
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act); 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (2000) (authoriz-
ing subpoenas for financial records from banks under the Right to Financial Privacy Act); 15
U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing subpoenas for credit agency information under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J) (2000) (authorizing subpoenas for educational
records under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act).
12. With respect to stored e-mail, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b) (2000) (authorizing, under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), subpoenas for e-mail that has been sitting on a
server for longer than 180 days without being opened and for e-mail that the recipient has ac-
cessed and stored on an outside server for any length of time). If the information is stored with a
service not available to the general public (e.g., one run by an employer), then the ECPA does
not apply and the government may obtain the stored information (content or identifying) simply
upon a request. See id. §§ 2703(a)(1)-( 3 ). With respect to Internet Service Provider logs, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 2703(c), (d) (authorizing access to these records if the government alleges that the
records are "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation").
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2000) (requiring courts to issue an order authorizing the use of
pen registers and trap and trace devices when a federal government attorney or state law en-
forcement officer certifies that phone numbers or e-mail addresses are "relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation"); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(7) (West Supp. 2004) (permitting a law enforce-
ment agency to obtain any federal agency record upon a written request by the head of the law
enforcement entity).
14. This phrase first appeared in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967), and has since become the standard definition of "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, at 90-91.
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Part I of this Article tries to explain how this state of affairs came to
pass. Throughout the nineteenth century, courts looked to the Fifth
Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, in analyzing the validity of
subpoenas, and most believed that the Fifth Amendment's injunction
against compelling a person to testify against himself prohibited the
government from demanding incriminating documents from a suspect.
Late in the nineteenth century the Supreme Court expanded on this
notion, by holding that such compulsion violated the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Fourth Amendment's restriction on unreasonable
searches and seizures. 16 At the turn of the twentieth century, how-
ever, the Court reversed itself, removing virtually all Fourth Amend-
ment strictures on document subpoenas and, when the documents
were corporate in nature, eliminating Fifth Amendment limitations as
well. This dramatic shift in the Court's posture was refined during the
first three quarters of the twentieth century and remains good law
today.
The point emphasized in Part I, however, is that the Court's deregu-
lation of subpoenas came in cases involving government attempts to
regulate businesses; not a single one of them involved searches of per-
sonal papers. Because, as far as the Court was concerned, personal
records held by the person him or herself-in those days, most per-
sonal records-remained protected by the Fifth Amendment's prohi-
bition on compelled testimony, the virtual elimination of Fourth
Amendment protection against subpoenas had no impact in that area.
Two relatively recent developments, also described in Part I, have
changed all that. First, within the past three decades, the Supreme
Court has radically altered its approach to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege, so that today personal records held by the target are almost as
unprotected as corporate records as far as that constitutional provi-
sion is concerned. Far more importantly, the modernization of society
has rendered the Fifth Amendment's application to personal records
largely irrelevant in any event. That is because, in contrast to nine-
teenth century culture, so much more of our personal information is
now recorded and held by third parties. When third parties are or-
dered to produce information via a subpoena, they cannot, under any
plausible interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, be said to be incrim-
inating themselves. Thus, when the government compels production
from a third-party recordholder-whether the recordholder is a hos-
16. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (discussed infra text accompanying notes
32-38).
[Vol. 54:805
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pital, an Internet Service Provider, or another government agency-it
is not violating the target's Fifth Amendment right.
Since today most subpoenas for personal documents are aimed at
third-party recordholders, the upshot of these developments is that
the government is almost entirely unrestricted, by either the Fifth or
Fourth Amendment, in its efforts to obtain documentary evidence of
crime. Part II of this Article confronts the various rationales for this
paltry regulatory regime. More specifically, it identifies six possible
reasons why subpoenas need not meet the probable cause standard
even when aimed at obtaining personal information (the first and last
of which apply to all subpoenas, and the rest of which are relevant
only to third-party subpoenas). The first justification, offered over a
century ago, is that subpoenas are not "searches" under the Fourth
Amendment because they do not involve physical intrusion. The sec-
ond, put forward by the modern Supreme Court, is that third-party
subpoenas are not searches because the information they seek is al-
ready exposed to others. The next three reasons are not as clearly
stated in Supreme Court opinions but are implicit in the Court's lan-
guage or are found in lower court decisions: The records obtained
through third-party subpoenas belong to the third party, not the tar-
get; third-party recordholders are no different from third-party wit-
nesses who have information about a suspect; and third parties have
an obligation to provide information to the government. The final
reason courts give for leaving subpoenas essentially unregulated is
also the most common: Imposition of rigorous Fourth Amendment re-
quirements on subpoenas would stultify important government
investigations.
The conclusions that Part II reaches with respect to these six ratio-
nales turn on the historical distinction described in Part I. Many of
the rationales for deregulating subpoenas are persuasive in the con-
text which most commonly triggers the use of subpoenas and in which
constitutional subpoena law developed-the investigation of corpo-
rate crime. But none of these rationales is convincing when applied to
demands for personal records.
If these conclusions are correct, then distinguishing between imper-
sonal and personal records is important. That is the task of Part III.
Ironically, this part of the Article borrows heavily from the Court's
old Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which justified protection of
records based in large part on a desire to create a "zone of privacy."
The irony stems from the fact that today, of course, the Fifth Amend-
ment is not about privacy at all, but rather about coercion. The fact
that the Court's early Fifth Amendment decisions were focused on
2005]
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protection of privacy suggests that, had the Court of one hundred
years ago known its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence would be jet-
tisoned, its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might have been much
more protective of documentary evidence that is personal in nature.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF SUBPOENAS
There are three legal processes for obtaining documents. The first
is the search warrant, which is issued ex parte and must be based on a
finding of probable cause.17 The second is a subpoena directed at the
person or entity whose activities are described in the documents (a
"first-party" or "target" subpoena). The third is a subpoena directed
at a person or entity who is not a target of an investigation but hap-
pens to hold records relevant to it (a "third-party" subpoena). As
noted above, subpoenas are usually valid so long as the documents
they demand are "relevant" to an investigation, a much lower stan-
dard than probable cause.18
Given this fact, warrants are seldom used to obtain documents. In
theory, a government agency interested in records might occasionally
prefer to rely on a warrant, despite the greater difficulty of obtaining
it, because of its efficiency and its scope. But in practice a warrant is
seldom superior to a subpoena.
The warrant's supposed advantage over the first-party subpoena is
that it is executed when it is served and thus avoids the possibility of
evidence destruction. But destruction of documents after receiving a
subpoena is unlikely where business records are involved, both be-
cause they are needed to run the business and because so many peo-
ple know of their existence that obstruction of justice charges are a
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"). Well over a
century ago the Supreme Court made clear that searches of paper require a warrant. In Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), the Supreme Court stated:
Letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage, in the mail can be opened and
examined only under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in
one's own household. The Constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their pa-
pers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.
Id. at 732.
18. Compare the definition of "relevance," supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, to the
standard definition of "probable cause," as a level of certainty approaching a more likely than
not finding. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, at 90-91 (stating that some Supreme Court cases
"may be read as adopting a more-probable-than-not test"). Although this source also notes that
lower courts do not tend to apply this high of a standard when it is known that a serious crime
has been committed and immediate apprehension is necessary, that situation rarely occurs in
connection with document searches. See id.
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real possibility if destruction occurs. 19 Shredding of documents is a
more likely response to a subpoena aimed at an individual's personal
records, but even here obstruction penalties tend to inhibit it.20
More importantly, personal information can usually be obtained via
a third-party subpoena, which of course eliminates the possibility the
target will destroy the evidence and, in many settings, also eliminates
the target's ability even to challenge the government's action.21 The
supposed advantage of a warrant over this type of subpoena is that it
will produce more or better records because the third party may not
have the information the government wants. But that is a trivial ad-
vantage in today's world. Most aspects of our personal life that have
been reduced to writing or digitized are stored with some third party.
Volumes of data about us can be found in "public" records maintained
by the government, and even more data is deposited with hospitals,
banks, schools, stores, and Internet Service Providers. 22 Under cur-
rent law, all of this information is just a subpoena (or less) away. In
light of these facts, it is not surprising that law enforcement rarely
resorts to a warrant to obtain documents and records.
23
The following discussion explains how this regulatory regime devel-
oped. It begins with the constitutional law governing first-party sub-
poenas-subpoenas for papers held by the individual whose activities
are described in the papers. It then examines the law of third-party
subpoenas.
19. Cf Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721. 750-56 (2003)
(describing the discovery of document shredding that occurred at the Arthur Andersen account-
ing firm in connection with the Enron scandal).
20. The potential penalties for obstruction minimize or negate the temptation to destroy
documents:
While ... suspects may be tempted to destroy evidence when it is called for by a sub-
poena, there is at least a somewhat greater chance that the evidence will be produced,
since the failure to produce the evidence may be punishable by contempt and the de-
struction of the evidence may constitute obstruction of justice.
BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-6-6-7.
21. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(E) & (d) (2000) (under the ECPA, a subpoena for sub-
scriber information and account logs may only be challenged by a third party); SEC v. Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc. 467 U.S. 735 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require notice
to the target of a third-party subpoena); ELLEN S. PODGOR & JERRY H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 252, 269 (2004) (noting that generally the target of a subpoena has no
standing to contest either grand jury or administrative subpoenas directed at third parties, al-
though also noting that Congress has authorized such standing with respect to subpoenas of
bank records, stored electronic communications, and tax records).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 118-119.
23. Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents Af-
ter United States v. Hubbell-New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 128
(2002) ("Subpoenas are used much more frequently than search warrants .... ").
20051
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A. Subpoenas Directed at the Target
The origin of the subpoena for documents can be traced back at
least to the time of King Charles II in the late seventeenth century.24
But it appears that these subpoenas were common only in civil litiga-
tion; even at their inception, courts hesitated to allow their use in
criminal cases. In 1748, the King's Bench cited cases from 1703 and
1744 in emphasizing that a court may not "make a man produce evi-
dence against himself, in a criminal prosecution. ' 25 A number of
other eighteenth century English courts straightforwardly held that
the government could never demand a person's books and papers.26
By the time the American Constitution was drafted, the matter was
well settled. As Professor Nagareda has noted, "All sources to ad-
dress the point concur that common law at the time of the Fifth
Amendment barred the compelled production of self-incriminatory
documents." 27
American judicial decisions in the nineteenth century appeared to
follow this English common law, although a few did allow compelled
production in criminal and quasi-criminal cases. 28 The issue probably
24. Wertheim v. Continental Ry. & Trust Co., 15 F. 716, 722 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) ("No trace
of the use of this writ [subpoenas duces tecum] by the common-law courts of England is to be
found in the books earlier than the time of Charles II.").
25. King v. Purnell. 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (K.B. 1748) (citing Queen v. Mead, 92 Eng. Rep. 119
(K.B. 1703)); King v. Cornelius, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. 1744)).
26. Chetwind v. Mernell, Exr., 1 Bos. & P. 271 (1798); Rex v. Dixon, 3 Burrows Reps. 1687
(1765); Rex. v. Cornelius, 2 Strange Reps. 1210 (1728); Rex v. Worsenham, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370
(K.B. 1701). As summarized in United States v. Three Tons of Coal, these decisions "accom-
plished the permanent overthrow in England, of the right at common law to search for and seize
the private papers of the citizen, for the purpose of convictions for crime, or for the purpose of
recovery in civil causes, where the evidence when produced would convict of a felony." 28
F.Cas. 149, 151-52 (D.C. Wis. 1875) (No. 16516).
27. Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1619 n.172 (1999).
28. United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. 352, 363 (1832) ("The privilege of refusing to [produce a
document] is one, personal to [the target] himself, of which he may avail himself or not at his
pleasure."); Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (holding that neither parties
nor their attorneys "could be required to produce documents to be used in evidence, if the
production of the paper might materially affect the rights or prejudice the interests of the witness
or person to whom it belonged"); Ex parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625, 639 (1859) (quoting 1
STARKIE'S EviD. 86 to the effect that while a person may be compelled to answer questions
orally, he is not "compellable" to produce documents "when the production might prejudice his
civil rights"); Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. 9, 14 (1830) ("a witness may be called and examined in a
matter pertinent to the issue, where his answers will not expose him to criminal prosecution, or
tend to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture" and equating compulsion of a witness to compul-
sion under a subpoena duces tecum); Anonymous, 8 Mass. 370 (1811) (holding that counsel had
no duty to deliver his client's papers to the grand jury). See generally McKnight v. United States
115 F. 972, 980 (6th Cir. 1902) (summarizing nineteenth century law as holding that "it would be
beyond the power of the court to require the accused to criminate himself by the production of
the paper as evidence against himself" and reversing a conviction in which the defendant was
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did not arise that often in the United States, just as it was seldom
litigated in England. 29 Documents sometimes could be obtained from
a source other than the suspect, which occasioned no Fifth Amend-
ment issue,30 and might also occasionally be obtained through a
search based on a warrant. In any event, street crime usually did not
generate documentary evidence, and state regulation of business
crimes, which was an area of regulation that was much more likely to
demand documents via subpoena, was in its infancy until late in the
nineteenth century. 31
It was a regulatory case, involving nonpayment of taxes, that pro-
vided the peak of constitutional protection for papers in the United
States. The case was Boyd v. United States,32 handed down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1886. Consistent with the early English com-
mon law, Boyd held that using a subpoena to force an individual to
produce private documents violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against compelled testimony. 33 But Justice Joseph P. Bradley's
opinion for the Court added a new twist to the analysis, holding that
such subpoenas also violated the Fourth Amendment's prescription
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 34 The Court came to this
conclusion even though the defendant company was subject only to
civil sanctions (which undermines an argument based on the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition of compelling testimony in criminal cases),
required to produce a document at trial). However, a number of nineteenth century federal
cases upheld subpoenas for documents relating to taxes and fees. See, e.g., United States v.
Hutton, 26 F. Cas. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 15433); United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 417
(C.C.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15417). See also United States v. Tilden, 28 F. Cas. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1879) (No. 15622) (stating, in a tax case, that "while the law jealously protects private books and
papers from unreasonable searches and seizures ... yet the principle is equally strongly held that
parties litigant have the right to have private writings which are competent for proof in their
causes produced in evidence," and permitting such production upon "preliminary proof of the
necessity").
29. Indeed, the Supreme Court asserted in 1886 that a congressional act passed in 1863
was the first act in this country, and, we might say, either in this country or in England,
so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized the search and seizure of a
man's private papers, or the compulsory production of them, for the purpose of using
them in evidence against him in a criminal case.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616. 622-23 (1886).
30. Cf United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. 352. 355 (1832) (holding that "secondary" evidence
may be used when the defendant will not produce the relevant document). See also infra notes
92-94 and accompanying text.
31. For a history of regulation by government during this period, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AcE OF REFORM (1955) (discussing populism and progressivism from 1890 to 1940). See
also HARRY FIRST, BUSINESS CRIME 2 (1990) (stating that "[tihe initial era of federal regulation
began with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887").
32. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
33. See generally id.
34. Id. at 621-22.
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and even though the documents at issue in Boyd were not personal
papers, but merely invoices used to prove fraudulent importation of
goods (which are hardly the types of intimate papers most closely as-
sociated with the privacy interests the Fourth Amendment protects).35
Dismissing these objections as mere quibbles,36 Justice Bradley stated:
The "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned
in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is
an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a
witness against himself. 37
This strong affirmation by the highest court in the land of what had
previously been, in the United States at least, an ambiguous constitu-
tional protection for papers had potentially major repercussions. As
Professor William Stuntz has noted, Boyd's holding, if allowed to
stand, would have seriously undermined the modern regulatory state,
which at that time was just building up steam.38 Without the ability to
readily obtain the records of corporations, partnerships, and other en-
tities, government agencies would be frustrated in their efforts to en-
sure that corporate tax laws, bank laws, securities laws, and a host of
other regulatory statutes were enforced.
For precisely that reason, within twenty years the Court had re-
versed itself. In the 1906 case of Hale v. Henkel,39 the defendant cor-
poration, suspected of antitrust violations, relied on Boyd in arguing
that a grand jury subpoena for its documents violated both the Fifth
and Fourth Amendments.40 In finding for the government, the Court
rejected the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that it had
adopted in Boyd, and limited the Fourth Amendment's relevance in
subpoena cases to a prohibition of overbroad requests. Acceptance of
the corporation's Fifth Amendment claim, the Court stated, "would
35. Id. at 618.
36. Specifically, Justice Bradley held for the Court that, although a suit for a civil penalty was
not within the "literal terms" of either amendment, it was "quasi-criminal [in] nature" and thus
within their spirit. Id. at 633, 634.
37. Id. at 633.
38. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 428
(1995).
39. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
40. Id. at 71.
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practically nullify the whole act of Congress [that outlawed monopo-
lies]. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these com-
binations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access
to every available source of information upon the subject?"41 For sim-
ilar reasons, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not pre-
vent use of a subpoena duces tecum to compel the production of
documentary evidence. Quoting an English decision, the Court
stated, "it would be 'utterly impossible to carry on the administration
of justice' without this writ."4 2
The move toward the current regime of virtually unlimited sub-
poena power was not immediate, however. In FTC v. American To-
bacco Co.,43 decided in 1924, a unanimous Court held that federal
antitrust law required the Federal Trade Commission to provide
"[slome evidence of the materiality of the papers demanded" by an
administrative subpoena.44 Although the holding was based on an in-
terpretation of a statute, the Court, per Justice Holmes, also stated
that "[a]nyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the
Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended
to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions
into the fire and to direct fishing expeditions into private papers.
4 5
Other Supreme Court and lower court cases exhibited similar resis-
tance to blind sanctioning of subpoenas administered by agencies.4 6
By the mid-1940s, however, the Court had carried through to its
logical conclusion Hale's assertion that significant restrictions on the
government's subpoena power would unduly stymie regulatory inves-
tigative efforts. In 1946, in Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling,4 7 the
Court canvassed the relevant authorities and concluded that
the Fifth Amendment affords no protection by virtue of the self-
incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its of-
ficers; and the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against
abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the
things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is
41. Id. at 70.
42. Id. at 73 (quoting Summers v. Moseley, 2 Cromp. & M. 477 (1834)).
43. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
44. Id. at 306.
45. Id. at 305-06 (citation omitted).
46. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) ("An investigation not based upon specified
grounds is quite as objectionable as a search warrant not based upon specific statements of
fact."). See also FTC v. Smith, 34 F.2d 323, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (requiring probable cause
before a subpoena could be enforced); FTC v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 F. 999, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1922),
affd on other grounds sub nom, FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
47. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the
materials specified are relevant.48
Oklahoma Press even insinuated that a subpoena is not an "actual
search" meriting Fourth Amendment protection. 49 Although this dic-
tum was glossed over four years later in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.,5° the Court adhered to the notion that "it is sufficient if the in-
quiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too in-
definite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. '5 1 Indeed,
"[elven if one were to regard the request for information in this case
as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law en-
forcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that cor-
porate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.152
In United States v. Powell,53 decided in 1964, the Court reiterated that
a government agency subpoena for records is valid if the records are
"relevant" to an investigation conducted for a "legitimate purpose"
(meaning one authorized by statute). 54  As applied, the Powell rele-
vance standard is extremely easy to meet.55
What has seldom been noted, however, is that all of these cases in-
volved government attempts to obtain corporate or other business
documents. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the
Court had intimated that subpoenas for private records might have to
meet a higher standard. For instance, in Hale the Court stated "there
48. Id. at 208.
49. Id. at 195 (stating that "the records in these cases present no question of actual search and
seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified
records have been validly made").
50. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
51. Id. at 652.
52. Id.
53. 397 U.S. 48 (1964).
54. Id. at 57-58.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Hunton & Williams, 952 F. Supp. 843, 854 n.28 (D.D.C. 1997)
(noting that the Powell inquiry is more deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review for agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act). See also United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 (1978) (holding that bad faith on the part of an individual
bureaucrat is insufficient to invalidate an administrative subpoena under Powell). The latter case
also held that an administrative summons may not be used as a criminal discovery device in tax
cases. Id. at 318. This holding is now memorialized in statute 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d). Of course, at
that point the grand jury continues the investigation, so the standard for issuing a subpoena does
not change substantially.
A very small minority of federal courts have purported to require a greater evidentiary show-
ing before issuing a subpoena but, if that is so, the showing is only minimally different. The case
most frequently cited for this proposition is In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d
85 (3d Cir. 1973), which required the government to make "some preliminary showing by affida-
vit that each item requested [is] at least relevant to an investigation being conducted by the
grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction and not sought primarily for another purpose." Id.
at 93.
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is a clear distinction [in cases involving demands for production of
books and papers] between an individual and a corporation. ' 56 Be-
cause a corporation "is a creature of the State," it "is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public," and it "receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of
the State and the limitations of its charter. '57 But an individual "owes
no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond
the protection of his life and property."58 Thus, in contrast to the cor-
poration, an individual retains the right to refuse "to incriminate him-
self, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or
seizure except under a warrant of the law."
59
In the years following Hale, Supreme Court and lower court cases
frequently reiterated, albeit usually in dictum, that only corporate
documents could be obtained pursuant to subpoena; private docu-
ments continued to be immune from compulsory process. 60 Four de-
cades later the Court was still echoing these sentiments when, in
Oklahoma Press, it characterized its earlier cases authorizing produc-
tion of documents pursuant to a subpoena as applying "merely to the
production of corporate records and papers."' 6' Shortly thereafter, in
Morton Salt, the Court simply stated that "corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. 62
In short, in the words of the Court's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,63 the Fifth Amendment created a "zone of privacy"
56. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913) ("It was the character of the
books and papers as corporate records and documents which justified the court in ordering their
production."); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911) ("Undoubtedly [the privilege
against self-incrimination] also protected him against the compulsory production of his private
books and papers."); Linn v. United States, 251 F. 476, 480 (2d Cir. 1918) ("While a person is
privileged from producing his books in a prosecution against himself, a corporation is not privi-
leged from producing its papers and books, even though they incriminate the officer who pro-
duces them."); Flagg v. United States, 233 F. 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1916) (holding invalid a subpoena
for personal books and papers); Hillman v. United States, 192 F. 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1911) ("It
will be observed that in the plea there is no distinct averment that any of the books or papers so
taken upon the subpoena duces tecum were the private books or papers of the plaintiff in er-
ror."); United States v. Hart, 214 F. 655, 661 (N.D.N.Y. 1914) ("Hart could not have been com-
pelled to produce these [private] papers and documents by subpoena duces tecum without
gaining immunity for himself.").
61. 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). See also United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707, 726 (1944) ("The Fifth Amendment does not protect a corporation against self-incrimina-
tion through compulsory production of its papers, although it does protect an individual.").
62. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
63. 38 U.S. 479 (1965).
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around personal papers. 64 From our perspective in the twenty-first
century, the Fourth Amendment seems a more appropriate source of
law for establishing privacy zones. But Hale had emasculated the
Fourth Amendment, at least in the subpoena context.65 Thus, for the
twentieth century Supreme Court, it was the Fifth Amendment or
nothing.
Eventually, it turned out to be nothing, or almost nothing. A signal
of things to come was the perplexing and seldom discussed opinion in
Ryan v. United States.66 Decided in 1964 on the same day as Powell,
and a year before Griswold's "zones of privacy" dictum, 67 Ryan
blithely announced that the minimal Powell requirements for adminis-
trative subpoenas aimed at corporations governed subpoenas for pri-
vate tax records as well.68 The Court reached this conclusion "for the
reasons given in [Powell],"69 without any further discussion. And
Powell's holding that probable cause need not be demonstrated to ob-
tain corporate tax records rested solely on an interpretation of the
relevant statutory language.70 The Powell opinion (and therefore
Ryan) did not mention the Fifth Amendment. Nor did it even refer to
the Fourth Amendment, the ostensible basis of the petitioner's claim
in Ryan.7t Thus, with one perfunctory statement that did not purport
64. Id. at 484 ("The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.-).
65. In the search warrant context, by contrast, the Court for a time relied on a combination of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to prohibit seizure of private papers, under the so-called
"mere evidence" doctrine. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (citing Boyd v.
United States in holding that search warrants "may not be used as a means of gaining access to a
man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to
be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding"). This doctrine is tangential to the sub-
ject of this Article, which focuses on subpoenas, and in any event has also since been emascu-
lated. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558 (1978) ("Once it is established that
probable cause exists to believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may issue for the
search of any property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of
concealment of evidence of the crime."); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) ("Nothing
in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence' and
instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband."). It is also worth emphasizing that the doctrine
was based more on the Fifth Amendment than the Fourth. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306 (stating
that whether private papers are seized from a person via a warrant or a subpoena, "[i]n either
case he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth Amendment forbids that he shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case").
66. 379 U.S. 61 (1964).
67. Griswold, 38 U.S. at 484.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 62.
70. Powell, 379 U.S. at 52-56.
71. The petitioner argued, among other things, that the IRS needed probable cause to obtain
his records. Ryan, 379 U.S. at 62. However, the petitioner did not make an explicit Fourth
Amendment argument, relying instead on statutory language.
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to address constitutional concerns, the Court seemed to obliterate the
sixty-year-old distinction between corporate and personal records in
connection with the subpoena process.
72
Because of its opaqueness, however, Ryan left some doubt as to the
application of the Constitution to subpoenas. Indeed, in United States
v. Dionisio,73 decided nine years later, the Court seemed to have for-
gotten all about Ryan. There, the Court held that neither the Fifth
Amendment nor the Fourth Amendment invalidated a grand jury sub-
poena for a voice exemplar, on grounds consistent with previous law:
The sound of a person's voice is not "testimony" within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment, and is not associated with Fourth Amend-
ment expectations of privacy because it is routinely exposed to the
public. 74 More importantly for present purposes, however, the Dion-
isio Court continued to assert, in apparent contrast with Ryan, that the
grand jury "cannot require the production by a person of private
books and records that would incriminate him," and cited Boyd.75 Al-
though Dionisio involved a grand jury subpoena, whereas Ryan dealt
with an administrative summons, the demands for production in these
cases were both pursuant to law enforcement investigations and thus
were functionally identical.
76
Ryan might have been limited to production of personal tax records
by analogizing such records to corporate documents and invoking
Hale's necessity rationale. Both types of records, it could be argued,
must be maintained and readily disclosed for the modern regulatory
state to function. Support for this distinction could be found in the
Court's decision in Couch v. United States,77 decided the same year as
Dionisio. Noting that federal law requires disclosure of much of the
information in tax records, the Court in Couch stated that in a "situa-
tion where obligations of disclosure exist and under a system largely
dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive ... [a person]
cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth or Fifth Amendment pur-
poses, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality. ' 78 Per-
haps this reasoning could have differentiated government attempts to
obtain tax records from its efforts to obtain other types of private fi-
72. Id.
73. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Id. at 7 (Fifth Amendment analysis); id. at 14 (Fourth Amendment analysis).
75. Id. at 11.
76. The records in Ryan were sought in conjunction with civil, rather than criminal, proceed-
ings, but the fact remains that the records could have been used in a criminal prosecution against
Ryan.
77. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
78. Id. at 335-36.
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nancial records, as well as medical, educational, and similar personal
information held in record form.
But that is not the route the Court chose to take. Rather, in 1976 it
discarded all of the language, from Boyd through Dionisio, regarding
the distinction between personal and business papers. Fisher v. United
States,79 like Ryan, involved a tax summons for personal records but,
unlike Ryan, Fisher directly repudiated the Fifth Amendment Boyd
claim in a way that appeared to apply to all documents, not just tax
records. More specifically, Fisher suggested that subpoenas virtually
never implicate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compelled self-
incrimination, either because they do not compel information or be-
cause, if they do, the information they compel is not self-incriminat-
ing.80 First, the Court noted, a subpoena does not force the creation of
documents, and thus the disclosure of document content demanded by
a subpoena does not implicate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of
compelled self-incrimination. 81 Second, Fisher held that while a sub-
poena does compel the production of documents, that act does not
provide the government with any useful incriminating information, at
least when proof of the source of the documents is not an important
element of the prosecution's proof or the government can prove the
source in some other way (which is often the case).82
The importance of Fisher is that it shifted Fifth Amendment analy-
sis from a "zone of privacy" focus to a focus on coercion. As the
Court said, "We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose
from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general pro-
tector of privacy, a word not mentioned in its text. ' 83 Because the
content of private documents are no more compelled than the content
of business documents, Fisher appeared to repudiate the impersonal-
corporate versus personal-individual distinction that earlier cases had
emphasized. Indeed, eight years after Fisher, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor felt confident enough to assert that "the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of
any kind."'84
79. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
80. Id. at 409.
81. Id. at 409-10. Fisher involved compulsion of documents from the defendant's accountant,
but Fisher's reasoning clearly applied to compulsion of documents from the defendant himself,
as the Court later made clear in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
82. For example, in most tax cases "[t]he existence and location of the papers are a foregone
conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's infor-
mation by conceding that he in fact has the papers." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
83. Id. at 401.
84. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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That is not the end of the story, however. Subsequent cases indicate
that the act of producing papers may be more likely to reveal incrimi-
nating information than Fisher suggested. For instance, in Braswell v.
United States,85 decided twelve years after Fisher, the Court held that
while the custodian of records generally may not resist a subpoena on
the grounds that production might incriminate him personally, he
should be able to prevent the government from mentioning that he
was the custodian. The Court also stated that the custodian might
even be able to avoid handing over the records in the first place if he
could show, for instance, "that he is the sole employee and officer of
the corporation [and] that the jury would [thereby] conclude that he
produced the records."' 86 And, in United States v. Hubbell,87 decided
in 2000, the Court held that, where the location and identity of the
documents demanded by a subpoena are not known by the govern-
ment beforehand, then compelling their production from the target of
the investigation implicates the Fifth Amendment. 88 In that situation,
the respondent is forced to take "the mental and physical steps neces-
sary to provide the prosecutor with an accurate inventory of the many
sources of potentially incriminating evidence sought by the
subpoena. '"89
Perhaps Hubbell moves Fifth Amendment analysis partially back
toward Boyd. Some commentators have gone so far as to say that
Hubbell requires probable cause in order to obtain a valid subpoena
for documents sought from the target.90 That is probably an exaggera-
tion of that decision's impact, especially where only a few documents
are sought and the target need not guess what the government is af-
ter.91 But even if Hubbell does reintegrate the Fourth and Fifth
85. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
86. Id. at 118 n.1l.
87. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 42.
90. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment,
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 865 (2001) ("[A]fter Hubbell, the working rule will be something like
the following: When faced with subpoenas for documents, suspects can comply or not as they
wish. For its part, the government can search for the evidence it wants, so long as it satisfies the
probable cause and warrant requirements." (footnotes omitted)). See also Cole, supra note 23,
at 188-89 ("After Hubbell, . . . prosecutors who take the subpoena approach may face a burden
comparable to that presented by the probable cause and particularity requirements for obtaining
a search warrant.").
91. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, at 39 (2005 Pocket Part) (noting that many subpoenas
provide enough information about the documents sought that the target need not use the "con-
tents" of his mind to identify them, and stating that "there is nothing in Hubbell's discussion of
the foregone conclusion doctrine that mandates ... a conclusive showing on the temporal com-
ponents of existence and possession").
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Amendments, it does not affect the lion's share of subpoenas that
seek personal papers, because most of these are directed at third par-
ties, not at those who are the subject of the records.
B. Third-Party Subpoenas
While early twentieth century cases adhered to the idea that the
Fifth Amendment prohibited access to personal papers held by the
target, they just as clearly stated that the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit compelling third parties to produce documents that are later
used against the target. A 1913 decision by the Supreme Court put
the matter quite pithily: "A party is privileged from producing evi-
dence but not from its production. '92 The one exception to this rule,
recognized at least as far back as the eighteenth century, 93 was that
records given to an attorney were protected to the same extent as they
would be if retained by their owner. Fisher continued to recognize
this exception as a means of honoring the attorney-client privilege. 94
But once Fisher reduced the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege
for targets, the extent to which attorneys could rely on the Fifth
Amendment to resist a subpoena aimed at client records was corre-
spondingly limited.
That treatment of the Fifth Amendment left the Fourth Amend-
ment as the only feasible protector of personal records held by third
parties.95 Although Hale had made clear that the Fourth Amendment
places few restrictions even on document subpoenas directed at the
target of an investigation, in 1967 the Supreme Court decided Katz v.
United States. 96 That case appeared to liberalize Fourth Amendment
92. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S.
7, 15 (1918). See also First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925) (holding that an
Internal Revenue Service summons directed to a third-party bank does not violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of either the bank or the person under investigation by the taxing
authorities).
93. Rex v. Dixon, 97 Eng. Rep. 1047 (K.B. 1765) (holding that an attorney need not turn over
a client's papers in connection with a forgery prosecution).
94. 425 U.S. at 405 (stating that "the papers, if unobtainable by summons from the client, are
unobtainable by summons directed to the attorney by reason of the attorney-client privilege").
95. Some have suggested that the First Amendment might protect very personal papers. See
Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: the Aftermath of
Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 702 (1982) (arguing that "the [F]irst
[A]mendment can prevent the government from probing into a defendant's most personal pa-
pers"). The First Amendment might also provide protection for records necessary to carry out
speech, such as records identifying e-mail users who use pseudonyms. See generally Anne Wells
Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in
Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995). But even if the First Amendment should be so inter-
preted, it would not affect most document subpoenas.
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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doctrine by rejecting a property-based, formalistic reading of the
Fourth Amendment and establishing that its guarantees were meant
to protect "expectation[s] of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
recognized as 'reasonable. "' 97 Given the private information poten-
tially obtained via a subpoena, Katz opened up the possibility that the
Court might require probable cause for a subpoena for personal infor-
mation sought from third parties, or at least impose on third-party
subpoenas restrictions roughly equivalent to that imposed on first-
party subpoenas by the act-of-production doctrine.
98
But within ten years of the Katz decision the Court had squelched
any movement toward converting third-party subpoenas into war-
rants. The first intimation of its unwillingness to apply Katz to sub-
poenas came in Couch v. United States,99 which involved seizure of
records from the petitioner's tax accountant. There the Court as-
serted that "there can be little expectation of privacy where records
are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein is required in an income tax re-
turn."'100 At least that language left open a ruling that records not
subject to mandatory disclosure would be afforded more Fourth
Amendment protection. However, in United States v. Miller,
101
handed down the same day as Fisher, the Court obliterated even that
possibility. In Miller, the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment
imposes no restrictions on any type of third-party subpoena, other
than those that protect the third party.
10 2
The defendant in Miller argued that a subpoena duces tecum that
required his bank to produce various records describing his financial
dealings violated his Fourth Amendment rights. But the Court con-
cluded, in effect, that Miller did not have standing to make this argu-
ment. 0 3  Referring to cases involving defendants who made
97. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This language later came to define the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
98. Cf United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), described supra notes 87-89 and accom-
panying text.
99. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
100. Id. at 335.
101. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
102. Id. at 444. The Court held:
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor are implicated here, this case is
governed by the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain
the records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal
prosecution is contemplated at the time of the subpoena is issued.
Id.
103. Id. at 441.
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incriminating disclosures to undercover agents, 10 4 the Court noted
that it had "held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con-
veyed by him to Government authorities.' 1 05 Just as a person who
reveals intimacies to an acquaintance assumes the risk the acquain-
tance will be or turn into an informant, a bank depositor "takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the government. ' 106 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that Miller possessed no cognizable expectation of
privacy in the financial information kept by his bank.
Miller left no doubt that the Court would reject a narrow interpreta-
tion of Couch. The records at issue in Miller were not subject to
mandatory disclosure under the tax laws. Further, they described all
of Miller's financial activities with the bank, and included three
monthly statements.107 Yet these differences with Couch did not give
the Court pause, as indicated by its declaration that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information in third-party records
"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed. 1 0 8
The Supreme Court has applied Miller's rationale to phone com-
pany records1 09 and loan applications,'10 and lower courts have used it
to uphold subpoenas for personal records from medical institutions,"'
104. The Court cited Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that government use
of an acquaintance as an informant is not a search), and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427(1963) (holding that the use of a body bug on an informant is not a search). It also could have
cited United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding, post-Katz, that the use of a body bug
on an informant is not a search); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (holding that an
undercover agent invited into a house is not conducting a search).
105. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 438 (describing the information obtained as including "all checks, deposit slips, two
financial statements, and three monthly statements").
108. Id. at 443. This language and the result in Miller would also seem to undercut any dis-
tinction based on the precise nature of the financial information in question. Cf California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect negotiable instruments held by banks, which are exposed to numerous individuals and thus
are arguably less private than the type of monthly statements involved in Miller).
109. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the identity of phone numbers that are routinely recorded by the phone company).
110. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in a loan application turned over to a bank).
111. Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729
(R.I. 1997); Corpus v. State, 931 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App. 1996). See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 2.7(d) (1996 & Supp. 2004) (citing various cases).
[Vol. 54:805
2005] SUBPOENAS AND PRIVACY 825
auditors and accountants, 112 trustees in bankruptcy," 3 and govern-
ment institutions.'14 Miller also has been the basis for cases upholding
federal statutes that permit government access to the records of In-
ternet Service Providers and to stored e-mail.' 15 Except in those cases
where a third party objects on overbreadth grounds, the Fourth
Amendment as construed in Miller appears to offer no protection for
personal records held by third parties, regardless of how much infor-
mation in those records is provided by the subject of the records or
the contractual arrangements between the parties.
This position has assumed ever greater significance as innovations
in computerization have made personal information both more likely
to be communicated to third-party recordholders and more accessible.
When Hale was decided, government recordkeeping was minimal and
business recordkeeping was sparse.116 Even in 1976, when Miller was
handed down, the Information Age had not begun in earnest.' 17 To-
day, government agencies keep detailed databases on many aspects of
our lives, 118 banks and credit card companies maintain voluminous
statements on our financial purchases, phone and Internet companies
record our communications, hospitals develop computerized descrip-
tions of our health problems, and digital records exist about our video
112. Wang v. United States, 947 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1991); Kinney v. United States, No.
96-550, 1995 WL 813170 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 1996).
113. In re Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 211 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
114. Doe v. DiGenova, 642 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1986) (V.A. records); People v. Carpenter.
998 P.2d 531 (Cal. 1999) (prison and parole records).
115. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that "plaintiffs ... lack a Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in their subscriber information because they communicated it to
the systems operators"); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000)
(holding that defendant could not "claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his
subscriber information" because "[w]hen defendant entered into an agreement with Road Run-
ner for Internet service, he knowing[ly] revealed" the information to his Internet Service
Provider).
116. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2002) ("Public record-keeping is largely a product of the twentieth
century."); Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors and Institutional Invest-
ment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 1030 (1993) (stating
that until the end of nineteenth century. "business records ... simply monitored expenses and
income").
117. Thomas A. Stewart & Jane Furth, The Information Age in Charts, FORTUNE, Apr. 4,
1994, at 75, 75 (asserting that 1991 signified the definitive end of the Industrial Age and the
beginning of the Information Age, because in that year business expenditures on computers and
communications for the first time exceeded the amount spent on industrial, agricultural, and
construction machinery).
118. Solove, supra note 116, at 1143 (stating that "[t]oday, a welter of public records is kept by
federal, state, and local governmental entities," and noting that public records include informa-
tion about birth, death, marriage, licenses, personal characteristics, real estate information, vot-
ing, and court appearances).
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rentals, library borrowing, and travel destinations.' 19 To obtain access
to all of this information, Miller requires, at most, a showing of
relevance.
C. Summary: From Complete to Virtually Nonexistent Protection
At the end of the nineteenth century, Boyd affirmed the common
law ban on government efforts to obtain incriminating papers from
their owners. Although that ban was soon lifted for business papers,
only in the last quarter of the twentieth century did the Court relax
constitutional strictures on subpoenas for self-incriminating personal
papers. In contrast, constitutional restrictions on subpoenas for pa-
pers in the possession of third parties have always been lax. The his-
torical change in this setting has not been in the law, but in the extent
to which personal information is now housed with third parties.
The end result of these developments is that, as a constitutional
matter, the minimal relevance standard once used primarily in con-
nection with business subpoenas now authorizes access to vast
amounts of personal information, to wit, any personal information
that is in record form, with the possible exception of information
found in records possessed by the target that the government is not
sure exist. On the surface, at least, that regime seems to conflict with
the Fourth Amendment's injunction that searches and seizures of pa-
pers, as well as of houses, persons, and effects, are unreasonable un-
less authorized by a warrant based on probable cause. To determine
whether the current system is justifiable, a closer look at its possible
rationales is necessary.
III. RATIONALES FOR DEREGULATING SUBPOENAS
The case law recited above relies, directly or indirectly, on a num-
ber of justifications for continuing to leave subpoenas largely unregu-
lated. The discussion below separates these justifications into six
119. One description of the proliferation of records in the possession of private companies
comes from Professor Solove:
Credit reports contain financial information contained in public records such as bank-
ruptcy filings, judgments and liens, as well as information relating to mortgage foreclo-
sures, checking accounts, and a list of all companies that requested the individual's
credit file. Some companies also prepare investigative consumer reports, which supple-
ment the credit report with information about an individual's character and lifes-
tyle .... In addition to credit card records, there are cable television records, video
rental records, phone records, travel records, and so on. The Medical Information 'Bu-
reau (MIB), a nonprofit institution, maintains a database of medical information on
fifteen million individuals, which is available to over 700 insurance companies.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Pri-
vacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1408-09 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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rationales. The first four can be characterized as arguments that sub-
poenas do not involve a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes
because they do not infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy,
while the last two focus on the strength of the government's interest in
keeping subpoenas unregulated. The first and last rationales apply to
all subpoenas, whereas the rest focus on third-party subpoenas. The
conclusion I reach is that, where business and other entity crime is
concerned, a few of these rationales do support relaxed strictures on
subpoenas, but none justify permitting government to obtain personal
records merely on a showing of relevance.
A. Subpoenas Are Not Intrusive
In his concurring opinion in Hale, Justice McKenna took the major-
ity to task for even suggesting that the Fourth Amendment applied to
subpoenas.1 20 In contrast to the traditional search, he argued, the sub-
poena does not involve "trespass or force" and "cannot be finally en-
forced except after challenge."' 121 Forty years later, in Oklahoma
Press,122 a majority of the Court echoed these sentiments, stating that
subpoenas do not trigger "actual searches," because they do not re-
quire a physical intrusion; rather, they are, at most, "constructive"
searches carried out by the target him or herself. 23 Thus, several Su-
preme Court justices have suggested that document subpoenas are not
Fourth Amendment searches for the following reasons: (1) They rely
on the recordholder, not the government, to produce the documents;
(2) the target can challenge them before surrendering any items; and
(3) they do not involve physical trespass or intrusion.
If the scope of the Fourth Amendment is to be determined with
reference to reasonable expectations of privacy, all three of these
lesser-intrusion rationales for the minimal restrictions on subpoenas
are specious. The fact that it is the target (or a third party) rather than
the police who locates the documents obviously does not change the
nature of the revelations they contain, which can include information
about medical treatment, finances, education, the identity of one's
communicants, and even the contents of one's communications. The
target's ability to challenge a subpoena, while it may inhibit some fish-
ing expeditions, at most will only delay government access to the
records, unless something beyond the current relevance standard is
applicable; recall also that, for many types of subpoenas, the target
120. 201 U.S. 43, 79 (1906) (McKenna, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 80 (McKenna, J., concurring).
122. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
123. Id. at 195, 202.
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has no right of challenge. 12 4 And if the notion that searches only oc-
cur when the government engages in physical invasion of private
space were correct, then electronic surveillance and technologically
assisted physical surveillance of the home would not be a search, since
neither usually requires a trespass or use of force. Yet the Supreme
Court has firmly declared that both of the latter types of government
action are governed by the Fourth Amendment and require warrants
based on probable cause. 125
While the technological surveillance example demonstrates why
physical intrusiveness should not be dispositive on the search issue, it
does not necessarily dictate that all document subpoenas be based on
probable cause. First, not all records are easily categorized as suffi-
ciently private to warrant the degree of constitutional protection pro-
vided to communications and activities that take place inside the
home. In particular, business records-the type of records involved in
all of the Supreme Court's early subpoena cases-might be consid-
ered much less personal than individual medical, financial, and e-mail
records; as the history described above makes clear, 126 the Court has
routinely recognized as much in a number of cases. Second, even
when the records sought are personal in nature, the rules governing
technological surveillance do not appear to apply when the records
are held by third parties, because generally only those subjected to
technological surveillance may challenge it.127 This limitation derives
from well-established doctrine that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions can be asserted only by those whose own private enclave is in-
fringed by the government's action.
B. Third-Party Subpoenas Do Not Infringe the Target's Privacy
That doctrine is, of course, the putative basis of the Court's opinion
in United States v. Miller where, it will be remembered, the Court held
that one cannot challenge government access to personal information
possessed by a third-party recordholder because one has surrendered
it "voluntarily" and thus "assumes the risk" that the third party will
provide it to the government.12 8 But Miller's version of Fourth
124. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (using a thermal imaging device to
detect heat differentials inside a house is a search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(bugging of a phone booth is a search requiring a warrant).
126. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
127. The one exception to this rule is when the challenger, although not a party to the inter-
cepted conversation, owns the house in which the conversation takes place. See Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969).
128. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
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Amendment standing is easily challenged. In fact, there are two sig-
nificant problems with the Court's reasoning in that case.
The first problem, as many have pointed out, is that the Court sim-
ply defies reality when it says that one "voluntarily" surrenders infor-
mation to doctors, banks, schools, and phone and Internet Service
Providers. 129 It is impossible to get treatment, engage in financial
transactions, obtain an education, or communicate with others with-
out providing personal information to the relevant entities or allowing
those entities to collect it. To "choose" to forego these activities
would mean an isolated, unproductive, and possibly much foreshort-
ened existence. The undercover agent cases, on which Miller relied,
involve an entirely different dynamic, where refusing to interact with a
particular individual is a realistic option. 130 Miller transforms all re-
cordkeeping institutions into undercover agents, which all but hermits
are powerless to avoid.
Even if the choice to reveal personal information to a third party or
to allow a third party to collect it could somehow be characterized as
voluntary, the Miller Court's second key assertion-that one thereby
"assumes the risk" that the third party will convey it to the govern-
ment13 1_-is pure judicial fiat. As I have written elsewhere, "we only
assume those risks of unregulated government intrusion that the
courts tell us we have to assume."' 132 Perhaps more to the point, even
though Miller has been the law for three decades, most people proba-
bly would be surprised to learn that banks hand over financial infor-
mation to the government virtually any time the government wants
it.133 A number of state courts have rejected, on state law grounds,
129. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
"the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society with-
out maintaining a bank account"); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, § 3.20).
130. See cases cited supra note 104.
131. 425 U.S. 435. 443 (1976).
132. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 400 (1997).
133. In a study in which participants were asked to rank the "intrusiveness" of various govern-
ment actions, "perusing bank records" was viewed as more intrusive than "searching [a] foot-
locker in a car" and a number of other government actions that require probable cause or at
least reasonable suspicion. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understand-
ings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 (1993).
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Miller's precise holding regarding bank records, 134 and many others
have declared that the decision does not apply to medical records. 35
A variant of Miller's reasoning, found in many of the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment cases, is that one lacks a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in places or items exposed to members of the
public. These decisions, involving the Fourth Amendment's applica-
tion to activities in public streets, open fields, curbsides, and backy-
ards, 136 have justly been criticized as inappropriately grudging in their
view of privacy. 137 In any event, they are only tangentially relevant in
this context, since the information in most records is not knowingly
given to anyone other than the third-party recordholder, and certainly
is not exposed to the public in the same sense that activity on public
streets or even one's backyard is.
To say Miller is wrong is not to say that third-party subpoenas al-
ways require probable cause, however. Again, certain types of
records (for example, those summarizing a purchase) may not be enti-
tled to as much protection as others (for example, those containing
134. Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d
1117 (Colo. 1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979).
135. King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 432, 495 (Ga. 2000); Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993). See also Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450-51 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding Miller
inapplicable to medical records).
136. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that a police flyover of
defendant's backyard was not a search because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this air-
space who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed"); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that police intrusion onto private property be-
yond the curtilage of the home is not a search because "[olpen fields ... are accessible to the
public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be");
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding that using a beeper to track the
defendant was not a search because driving "over the public streets ... voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular
direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited
from public roads onto private property"). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40
(1988) ("It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public.").
137. Consider these remarks:
People who rummage through their neighbors' garbage, trespass on fenced-off fields,
and stalk people, however, are criminals who intrude upon others' sense of security,
safety, and privacy. We all risk falling prey to such criminals simply by carrying out our
lives in an unobjectionable manner-putting out our garbage, taking solitary walks on
private property, and going for drives in public. Taking these risks does not, however,
represent consent or knowing exposure of our private lives, and does not render the
criminal actions that sometimes follow innocuous, whether carried out by our neigh-
bors or by the police.
Sherry F. Kolb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 137 (2002).
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medical and financial information). 38 The important point for pre-
sent purposes is that the government should not have practically un-
restricted access to records simply because the records reside with a
third party.
C. Third-Party Records Belong to the Third Party
Miller exempted third-party subpoenas from Fourth Amendment
oversight by asserting that a person has no privacy interest in informa-
tion surrendered to a third party. a39 One also might try to justify
Miller's holding by focusing on the recordholder's, rather than the
subject's, interest in the information. After all, the third party ostensi-
bly "owns" the records, not only because it physically possesses them
but because it creates them. Arguably, this property interest confers
on the recordholder the right to assign the information, and eliminates
the subject's control over it.140 A variant of this argument asserts that
permitting the subject to limit the third party's use of personal data
unduly restricts the third party's interests in commercial freedom and
freedom of speech. 141
This "property" rationale has both a descriptive and a normative
flaw. The descriptive problem is that, while the physical documents
maintained by third-party recordholders may be the third party's
property alone, their content generally is not wholly within their con-
trol. Indeed, federal law recognizes that individuals retain an interest
even in information maintained in public records; under the Privacy
Act they have a right to participate in the use, review, and disposal of
138. I develop these distinctions in Slobogin, supra note 9, at 21-22. For another effort at
addressing these distinctions in a specific context, see Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expecta-
tions in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1579-83 (2004) (arguing that stored e-mails should
received enhanced protection because of (1) the "nature of the record," (2) the fact that, unlike
the bank in Miller or the phone company in Smith, ISPs have no "independent interest" in the
personal information, and (3) the fact that, unlike the defendants in those two cases, the recipi-
ent of the e-mail does not intend to disclose its contents to the ISP).
139. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
140. In Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918), the Court held that even continued
ownership of property does not confer a constitutional interest in property that has been surren-
dered to a third party.
141. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1080-84 (2000). See
also U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (overturning, on First Amendment
grounds, Federal Communications Commission regulations requiring customer approval of use
of personal information for marketing).
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their files, 14 2 and the Freedom of Information Act circumscribes out-
sider access to a wide range of personal information. 143  Professor
Mashaw has gone so far as to say that these two statutes "gave all
citizens 'property rights' in the information held by government bu-
reaus.' 1 44 If that is true of public records, it should surely be the case
with privately held records such as those maintained by hospitals,
banks, and schools because their contents are even more likely cre-
ated under laws that give the subject some degree of control over
them.1
4 5
The normative flaw in the property rationale is identical to the flaw
in Miller. Third-party recordholders possess the personal information
they do because people must give it to them in order to function in
society; in property terms, the subjects are involuntary bailors of the
information, and recordholders should be seen as their bailees. Rec-
ognition of this point does not mean that the individual can prevent
the third party from using the information for the purpose for which it
was obtained. But it should mean that the third party does not have
total discretion to do whatever it wants with the information simply
because it "owns" it.146 In other words, the subjects of records should
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000) (entitling an individual to a copy of his or her record and "any
information pertaining to him which is contained in the system," and providing a procedure in
contested cases, ultimately involving judicial review, for amending the record).
143. Id. § (b)(6) (prohibiting disclosure of "personnel and medical files, and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); id.
§ (b)(7) (prohibiting disclosure of law enforcement records that "could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
144. Jerry L. Mashaw,"Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1137
(1983) ("The Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act gave all citizens 'property rights'
in the information held by government bureaus."). See also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1436 (2000) ("Person-
ally-identified data is neither unambiguously data processors' property nor simply their speech
. .. . .).
145. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2004) (providing individuals a right to copy and inspect
their otherwise private health information under the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act of 1996); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g-1681i (2000) (providing indi-
viduals a right to access their credit reports and insist upon corrections); Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232q(a)(b) (2000) (requiring schools to provide parental
access to student records and permitting parents to challenge the records if they are misleading,
inaccurate, or violate the student's privacy). Although no analogous statute for bank records
exists, that is presumably because the customer either generates them (e.g., through checks) or
receives a detailed periodic statement describing the information possessed by the bank, the
latter of which can be corrected by the customer.
146. See King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000) ("Even if the medical provider is the
technical "owner" of the actual records, the patient nevertheless has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information contained therein, since that data reflects the physical state of his or
her body."). An even stronger statement of this idea (perhaps too strong) is found in interna-
tional laws and the laws of other countries. Consider, for instance, the United Nations Guide-
lines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Files, G.A. Res. 45/95, U.N. GAOR, adopted
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have standing to contest their disclosure to law enforcement unless
the records were constructed for that purpose.
But suppose the third party has a "privacy policy" that specifically
notifies the subject that information surrendered to it may be trans-
mitted to other entities, including the government? 47 Then hasn't
one contracted away any property interest in the information? In the-
ory, of course, a person should be able to consent to disclosure of
personal facts. But, as Professor Daniel Solove has persuasively ar-
gued, contract and market-based models do not work well in this con-
text. 148  We rarely have any real "relationship" with the third-party
entities that acquire our information, possess virtually no bargaining
power over them, are often ignorant of or confused about the third
party's privacy "offer," and in any event frequently have no way to
opt out of or fine-tune the "contract. ' 149  As Professor Solove says,
there is "a problem in the nature of the market itself that prevents fair
and voluntary information transactions.' 150 That, of course, is the
same sort of reason Miller is flawed.
D. Subpoenas Duces Tecum Are Constitutionally Equivalent
to Subpoenas Ad Testificandum
The next argument that governmental requisition of records should
be subject to minimal restrictions rests on an analogy to the law gov-
erning demands for testimony from a third party. Many witnesses
subject to subpoena are not the targets of the investigation and thus
will not be able to (or want to) assert the Fifth Amendment. Because
the government can compel these third-party witnesses to reveal in-
formation about someone without demonstrating any suspicion re-
Dec. 14, 1990, as General Assembly Resolution 45/95, reprinted in MARC ROTENBERG, THE
PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2003: UNITED STATES LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 367 (2003). Under "Principle of the Purpose-Specification," the Guidelines
state:
The purpose which a file is to serve and its utilization in terms of that purpose should
be specified, legitimate and, when it is established, receive a certain amount of publicity
or be brought to the attention of the person concerned, in order to make it possible
subsequently to ensure that:... (b) None of the said personal data is used or disclosed,
except with the consent of the person concerned, for purposes incompatible with those
specified.
Id. at 368.
147. See generally John Schwartz, Privacy Policy Notices Are Called Too Common and Too
Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at B1.
148. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
149. Id. at 81-87.
150. Id. at 91.
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garding that person, this argument posits, it should be able to obtain
records from a third party under the same circumstances. 51
Looked at more closely, however, this analogy between subpoena
ad testificandum and subpoenas duces tecum does not work. Neither
of the two reasons a witness should be able to testify over a target's
objection apply to a third-party recordholder. The first reason, having
to do with the witness's prerogatives, is discussed here. The second,
which has to do with the government's interest in hearing the witness,
is discussed in the next section.
It may seem incontestable that, outside of those situations where
the attorney-client, spousal, or other privilege applies, one person
should not be able to prevent another person from providing informa-
tion to the government. But explicating why this is the case for the
typical third-party witness elucidates why third-party recordholders
should be treated differently. As Professor Coombs has argued, peo-
ple in possession of information about others, even information that is
"private" and obtained through an intimate relationship, have "an au-
tonomy-based right to choose to cooperate with the authorities.' a52
According to Professor Coombs, "To deny even the possibility of such
a decision [to cooperate] is to turn a freely chosen relationship into a
status, denying one person's full personhood to protect another's in-
terests."1 53 In other words, the autonomy interest of a putative wit-
ness trumps the privacy interest of a putative target when a witness
decides to reveal information about the target. Thus, the target
should not be able to control the witness's testimony.
That analysis only makes sense, however, when the third party is a
person. Most records are held by institutions, not people. And, as
Hale suggested a century ago when it denied corporations the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, 154 institutions do not have autonomy
interests. A bank, hospital, or Internet Service Provider is not denied
its "personhood" when its ability to turn information over to the gov-
ernment is restricted. Accordingly, the analogy between third-party
151. Cf. State ex rel. Pollard v. Criminal Court, 329 N.E.2d 573, 585 (1975) ("[A] witness,
subpoenaed to produce his records to a grand jury . . . may not assert his fourth amendment
expectation of privacy in such records;" like a witness subpoenaed to testify, he has "no right to
privacy... and may not decline to answer on the grounds that his responses might prove embar-
rassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs." (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974))).
152. Mary Irene Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or The Rights of Rela-
tionships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (1987).
153. Id. at 1644.
154. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) ("The amendment is limited to a person who shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the
privilege of a third person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation.").
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witnesses and third-party recordholders fails. Targets should be able
to expect that information will remain with the institution unless the
government demonstrates a substantial need for it.
This view of how third-party autonomy interests are relevant to
Fourth Amendment analysis provides an additional explanation for
why the undercover agent cases do not support Miller's reasoning.
Many commentators have argued that both sets of decisions are
wrong because we should be able to expect that the government will
not turn either our social or our business relationships into investiga-
tive tools without some justification. 155 But even if, relying on Profes-
sor Coombs' analysis, one accepts the "social undercover agent" cases
as valid law, they are distinguishable from the "institutional under-
cover agent" cases like Miller because social agents have an autonomy
interest that institutional agents lack. In cases involving the latter sce-
nario, there is no third-party interest to trump the target's interest in
privacy, which should therefore be accorded greater respect than it is
under current subpoena jurisprudence.
E. Third Parties Are Obligated to Provide the Government
with Investigative Leads
The second reason that might be given for denying a person stand-
ing to prevent another person from testifying focuses on government
rather than witness interests. The Supreme Court frequently has spo-
ken of the obligation to give testimony to grand juries.' 56 Certainly
citizens should feel they have a duty to help government apprehend
law violators. Thus, the argument here is that third-party
recordholders have a duty to hand over documents that might tend to
incriminate others, even over strenuous objections by those
incriminated.
Again, there are descriptive and normative problems with this argu-
ment. While the Court talks about an "obligation" to provide evi-
155. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 728 (1985) (describing
the logic of the "false friend" cases as "fundamentally defective and exceedingly dangerous to
liberty"). I have made similar arguments, at least when the false friend is a person who has been
importuned by the government to be an informant rather than, as discussed in the text, one who
makes contact with the police after the legally relevant event occurs. See Christopher Slobogin,
The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 103-06 (1991).
156. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973). See also Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) ("[Olne of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to
support the administration of justice by ... giving his testimony whenever he is properly sum-
moned."); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) ("The personal sacrifice [associated
with giving testimony to a grand jury] is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to
the welfare of the public.").
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dence, in fact most jurisdictions no longer criminalize misprision and,
at least when their interlocutor is a police officer, individuals are not
legally required to respond to inquiries even when the potential for
self-incrimination is nonexistent. 57 What the Court probably intends
to say when it speaks of evidentiary duties is that the individual has an
obligation, enforced by the contempt power, to respond to a valid
subpoena.
So the real issue is, when is a subpoena valid? My answer to that
question should be apparent by now. While a relevance showing may
be sufficient to support a subpoena for business documents or testi-
mony from a third-party witness, that low standard ought to be inade-
quate when personal information is sought from the subject (in which
case a warrant should be required or immunity granted) or from a
third-party recordholder such as a bank, hospital, or Internet Service
Provider. In the latter situation, one can counterpose against the
recordholder's "duty to give evidence" a fiduciary "duty of alle-
giance," which obligates the recordholder to use information for the
purpose for which it is acquired. 158 As discussed above, 159 the latter
duty is consistent with current societal understandings.
Although the few courts that have addressed the issue have been
reluctant to endorse such a duty of allegiance, their hesitation has
come in cases where the "personal" information disclosed by the third
party was not particularly private.160 Whatever the appropriate result
is in such cases, the duty should be much stronger where its breach
involves an individual's medical, financial, and similar personal infor-
mation.' 61 That duty would not, of course, prohibit government from
157. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, at 114.
158. See SOLOVE, supra note 148, at 103 ("[T]he law should hold that companies collecting
and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.").
159. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
160. Compare Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing the
claim that Time's distribution of names and addresses to a direct marketing company violated its
readers' privacy), with Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, No. Civ. A 98-0897F 1999 WL 494114, at *5
(Mass. Super. June 29, 1999) (denying summary judgment for CVS against claims that its use of
prescription information to support a direct mail campaign violated statutory right to privacy,
unfair practices law, confidentiality and fiduciary duties, and the tort of misappropriation of
private personal information). Falling between these two cases is Dwyer v. American Express
Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (dismissing the claim that American Express's rental of
customer spending histories stated an intrusion into privacy claim but holding that American
Express did violate a deceptive practice law).
161. Recognition of such a duty also is likely to be beneficial to the third party. Turning these
entities into automatic agents of the government, which is the effect of current subpoena law,
may betray the trust that is necessary for them to function. Thus, in an effort to avoid customer
complaints about being a conduit to the government, America Online and Earthlink no longer
maintain clickstream data. Conversation with Peter P. Swire, Professor of Law, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law, Sept. 20, 2004, at Ohio State College of Law. See also Lee
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obtaining personal information from third parties. But it would re-
quire that the government demonstrate some need for the information
beyond the minimal relevance showing now required. Absent such a
showing, the obligations of the third party should run to the subject of
the records, not the state.
F. Regulating Subpoenas Would Destroy Investigative Effectiveness
The most common objection to the position just described is the
one advanced originally in Hale: A higher standard would make gov-
ernment regulation impossible. 162 This rationale frequently appears in
cases justifying administrative subpoenas issued by government agen-
cies. In the mid-twentieth century case of United States v. White,1 63 for
instance, the Supreme Court stated, "The scope and nature of the eco-
nomic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and
their representatives demand that the constitutional power of the fed-
eral and state governments to regulate those activities be correspond-
ingly effective," and went on to uphold a subpoena against a labor
union. 164 Judge Selya's dissent in Parks v. FDIC,165 a First Circuit
case which briefly recognized enhanced protection for private papers
before being withdrawn, provides a modern pronouncement of the
claim:
Administrative investigations differ significantly from criminal in-
vestigations: government agencies typically investigate in order to
enforce compliance with complicated structures of economic regula-
tion. The ability to obtain information from regulated parties and
those persons in privity with them typically is vital to the success of
the regulatory scheme [citing United States v. Morton Salt Co. and
Oklahoma Press] .... And it is a fact of life that agencies charged
with regulating economic activity often cannot articulate probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion that a violation has transpired
without first examining documents reflecting a party's economic ac-
tivity .... This incipient problem-the need to hitch the horse in
Kovarsky, Tolls on the Information Superhighway: Entitlement Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89
VA. L. REV. 1037, 1069 (2003) ("A state of informational privacy where collecting agents exhib-
ited no fidelity to user expectations would generate uncertainty that would almost certainly deter
web surfing, making it more difficult for collecting agents to acquire data in the first place.");
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1305-07
(2000) (detailing examples of businesses bowing to pressure to stop using personal data for mar-
keting purposes and noting that "[n]one of the businesses caught misusing customer data re-
sponded by suggesting that nobody really expected her data to be private in today's world").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
163. 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
164. Id. at 701.
165. 65 F.3d 207 (1st Cir. 1995) (advance sheets). The opinion was later withdrawn from the
Federal Reporter after a rehearing en banc was granted. See 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 519, 547 n.266
(citing In re Gimbel, 77 F.3d 593 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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front of the cart-is frequently exacerbated because the subpoena
power has great significance for most administrative agencies in the
conduct of important public business.166
Although these two statements about the need to ease restrictions
on agency investigations are representative, note that they both refer
to cases involving organizational targets. White's call for "effective"
regulation is based on a perceived need to probe the "economic activi-
ties of incorporated and unincorporated organizations" and Judge
Selya specifically distinguishes "administrative investigations" from
"criminal investigations." In short, these decisions use the impossibil-
ity rationale only in the same subset of cases that previous discussion
associated with diminished privacy concerns.
The same sort of distinction can be seen in grand jury cases, al-
though it is less conspicuous. A constant refrain in decisions aboutjury subpoenas since at least 1919 is the notion that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence"-the flip side of the idea that citizens
have a duty to help the government. 167 That language suggests that
the Court believes there is a strong government need for the informa-
tion that grand jury subpoenas provide. Yet, consistent with the fact
that grand juries historically focused on investigation of organiza-
tional, and in particular, governmental, corruption rather than individ-
ual crimes,168 these cases also routinely noted that the grand jury
inquiry is limited by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compel-
ling a person to incriminate him or herself. 169 A relatively recent case
illustrating this impersonal-personal dichotomy is United States v.
Dionisio.170 There, in line with previous case law, the Supreme Court
baldly stated that the grand jury's right to evidence from every citizen
is "necessary to the administration of justice. ' 171 But recall that Dion-
isio also carefully exempted "private books and records" from its
purview.
Of course, once Fisher limited the reach of the Fifth Amendment,
this exemption was vulnerable. As a result, the impossibility rationale
has found its way into arenas outside the entity corruption context.
For instance, one lower court relied on the rationale in permitting a
166. Parks v. FDIC, No. 94-2262, 1995 WL 529629, at *11 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (Selya, J.,
dissenting).
167. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
331 (1950)); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 281 (1919).
168. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, at 13-14 (describing the "public watchdog" function of
the grand jury during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
169. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689-90.
170. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
171. Id. at 10.
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blood test on relevance grounds. Given that grand jurors must have
probable cause to indict, the court stated, "it would be peculiar to
require them to demonstrate the same degree of probable cause to
believe that a target of their investigation committed a crime before
the grand jury could properly obtain evidence in aid of their investiga-
tion." 72 If applied to document subpoenas, this type of reasoning
would make no distinction between organizational documents and
personal ones.
That would be a mistake. First, of course, the impossibility ratio-
nale is a dangerous one regardless of the context, for the government
can always make pleas that the Fourth Amendment and other consti-
tutional rights make its law enforcement job difficult. 173 Even ac-
cepting the impossibility rationale on its face, however, it at most
justifies minimal restrictions on subpoenas for business records and-
at a stretch-for private financial records of individuals that must be
maintained for tax purposes (assuming Couch is right that otherwise
the tax system would not "survive"). 7 4 It does not explain why sub-
poenas as currently conceptualized should authorize compulsory pro-
duction of personal records in connection with ordinary "criminal
investigations" (to use Judge Selya's language).
Perhaps judges are not attuned to this problem because they believe
that subpoenas are seldom used for such purposes. That assumption,
while probably true during much of the twentieth century, is no longer
accurate. For instance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) not only re-
lies on subpoenas to investigate antitrust violations,175 government
fraud,176 and other organizational crimes, but also is authorized to use
172. In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 692 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Mass. 1998).
173. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 523, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("There is no principle in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights which permits constitutional
limitations to be dispensed with merely because they cannot be conveniently satisfied.").
174. I think survival would be likely. Before Ryan, the Supreme Court case that rejected a
probable cause requirement in the tax context, some courts had required probable cause in order
to obtain tax records. See, e.g., Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959). In Ryan itself,
the IRS probably had probable cause. ("The complaint alleged that on the basis of estimated net
worth calculations the agent strongly suspected fraud"). The IRS usually selects tax return au-
dits based on "mathematical formulas developed from intensive examination of returns selected
at random to identify those with a high probability of error." BoRIs I. BITTKER ET AL., FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 47-3 (3d ed. 2002). Audits are also triggered by iden-
tification of items that do not appear allowable, complaints by former employees, former
spouses and acquaintances, and conspicuous tax protests. Id. But assuming I am wrong about
this, I would carve out a narrow exception for tax records under the "required records" doctrine.
See infra text accompanying notes 206-211.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (2000).
176. 5 U.S.C. App. 3, § 6(a)(4) (2000).
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subpoenas to obtain records in connection with kidnapping, 77 child
pornography,' 78 false claims and bribery, 179 health care fraud, 80 rack-
eteering,181 and possession or sale of controlled substances. 8 2 And
the DOJ is not shy about taking advantage of its authority. In 2001, it
issued almost 1,900 subpoenas seeking Internet records concerning
child exploitation and abuse, 83 and a total of 2,102 subpoenas seeking
bank, medical, and other records in connection with health care of-
fenses. 184 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, government use of
subpoenas directed at Internet Service Providers in attempts to iden-
tify national security threats has been particularly prolific.'85
Whatever might be the case with respect to complex economic
wrongdoing, the claim that these latter types of crimes are "impossi-
ble" to investigate without subpoena power is not true. In most such
cases, the content of documents are secondary to other evidence ob-
tained through interviews and interrogations, physical observation,
traditional searches, and other non-documentary investigative tech-
niques.' 86 If, as I have argued elsewhere, subpoenas for "catalogic
data" (for example, phone numbers called and purchases made) are
177. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 348(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), (a)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2004) (limiting access to e-mail
subscriber information connected with kidnapping of children).
178. Id. (e-mail subscriber information only).
179. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2000).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000).
181. Id. § 1968.
182. 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (2000).
183. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUB-
POENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES 37 (2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/intro.pdf.
184. Id. at 34-35. Information about the number of DOJ subpoenas issued in connection with
false claims, bribery, racketeering, and controlled substance investigations is not available. It
should also be noted that many subpoenas for medical records are in aid of investigations aimed
at pharmacists or doctors for violations of controlled substances or health fraud laws. In such
cases, privacy concerns may well be absent, because the information sought need not be linked
to a particular patient. Cf. Comm. v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985) (holding that, in Medicaid
investigations, contents of patient records were privileged, but documents detailing the number
of patients seen and the frequency and length of patient visits were not).
185. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commer-
cial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 595, 621 (2004) (quoting one official of an Internet Service Provider to the effect that
government requests for information have "increased fivefold" since September 11, 2001).
186. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-3 (noting that "ordinarily, investigations of so-called
'street crime' such as murder, rape, robbery, and assault can be conducted effectively without
resort to the subpoena power"). Even in business investigations, this is often the case. See, e.g.,
United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that an agency carrying
out an administrative inspection had developed probable cause to believe that pharmacists were
violating the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act, based on reports of large ship-
ments of controlled substances to the pharmacy, tracing of certain shipments, surveillance of the
pharmacy, and the arrest of some of the pharmacy's customers).
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also permitted, there is even less need for a relaxed standard for au-
thorizing government attempts to obtain the contents of docu-
ments. 187 Even with respect to those individual crimes that depend on
transactional proof, such as fraud, tax evasion, and computer hacking,
development of individualized suspicion is generally easier than in
regulatory cases, where the chain of command hides responsibility,
proof can involve very complex, technical evidence, and non-docu-
mentary evidence of crime may literally be nonexistent.188 The im-
possibility rationale, as applied to personal papers, is not based on
reason, but on tradition, a tradition created in cases concerned about
the efficacy of the administrative state rather than everyday law
enforcement.
IV. SEPARATING THE PERSONAL FROM THE IMPERSONAL
The foregoing critique of current subpoena law suggests that the
distinction between personal and impersonal records is a crucial one
because it defines the threshold at which the relevance standard
should no longer apply. Thus far not much has been said about the
nature of that threshold. As it turns out, Supreme Court case law is
very helpful in defining it. This assistance comes not, as one might
think, from the Court's Fourth Amendment cases, but rather from its
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which, as Part I explained, in its
early incarnation tried to delineate a "zone of privacy."'
189
Boyd, the Supreme Court's initial foray into the constitutionality of
subpoena law, held that even business papers fell within the privacy
zone. 190 But Hale soon created the distinction that permeates this Ar-
ticle. As indicated earlier, the latter case denied the Fifth Amend-
187. Slobogin, supra note 9, at 41 (defining catalogic data as "information that classifies and
describes a transaction, as distinguished from the content of the transaction").
188. Compare this recent summary of the problems associated with corporate investigation to
investigation of "ordinary" crime:
Despite the seemingly broad liability made possible by respondeat superior, it is no-
toriously difficult to prosecute corporations for violations of specific intent crimes.
First, corporate crime is highly concealable, typically because victims are unaware of
their injury. Even when crime is revealed, it is challenging to identify within an organi-
zation a particular guilty actor.
Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Lo-
cating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 467-68 (2004) (footnotes omitted). See also
FRANCIS CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK 350 (1987) (stating that "the laby-
rinthian structure of many modern corporations often makes it extremely difficult to pinpoint
individual responsibility for specific decisions").
189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also supra notes 56-65 and accom-
panying text.
190. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (stating that "any compulsory discov-
ery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers,
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ment right to corporations on the ground that a corporation is "a
creature of the state," in contrast to the individual citizen, who "owes
no duty to the state ... to divulge his business." 19' Hale was the first
in a series of cases that laid out the so-called "collective entity" excep-
tion to the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.' 92 In effect, the
Court used this exception to delineate the difference between per-
sonal and impersonal papers.
By the time of Fisher, which changed the focus of the Fifth Amend-
ment from privacy to coercion and thus marginalized the excep-
tion, 193 the Court had expanded the collective entity doctrine to
encompass far more than compulsion of documents that incriminate a
corporation (the situation in Hale). For instance, five years after Hale,
in Wilson v. United States,194 the Court found that a corporate officer's
refusal to produce subpoenaed corporate records was not protected
by the privilege even when their production might also incriminate
him, because the records were not "personal;" 195 rather they were
"subject to examination by the demanding authority" and their custo-
dian thereby had "accepted the incident obligation to permit inspec-
tion. ' 196 Some three decades after Wilson, in United States v. White, 97
the Court held that labor unions were also "collective entities," be-
cause a union has "a character so impersonal in the scope of its mem-
bership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent
the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather
to embody their common or group interests only."'1 98
Thirty years after that, and two years before Fisher, the Court nar-
rowed the "zone of privacy" even further by refusing, in Bellis v.
United States,199 to permit a small law firm to assert the privilege. Al-
though the firm was a partnership that "embodie[d] little more than
the personal legal practice of the individual partners, ' 200 it was a "for-
mal institutional arrangement organized for the continuing conduct of
to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free
government").
191. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
192. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 392 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the collective entity doctrine).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
194. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
195. Id. at 378.
196. Id. at 382.
197. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
198. Id. at 702.
199. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
200. Id. at 95.
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the firm's legal practice,"120' and thus was "an independent entity
apart from its individual members. 202 Although decided after Fisher,
United States v. Doe203 continued in the spirit of Bellis by holding that
even a sole proprietor's records are not protected by the Fifth
Amendment (unless, per Fisher, the act of production provides the
government with proof of its case), thus dealing the final blow to the
Boyd doctrine as applied to businesses.20 4 Lower courts have also rec-
ognized an analogous "government records exception" that governs
subpoenas for records describing the operations of a government
agency.20 5
During the same period it was developing the collective entity doc-
trine, the Court was sketching out the contours of a "required
records" exception to the Fifth Amendment, in connection with sub-
poenas for records of individuals. In Shapiro v. United States,206 de-
cided in 1948, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not bar a
subpoena directing an individual to produce commodity sales records
that the Emergency Price Control Act required him to maintain.
20 7
Although the Court recognized that the government should not be
able to vitiate the privilege simply by requiring that an individual keep
and surrender written records, it concluded that in this case there was
''a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and
the public concern. °20 8
More persuasively, in the later case of Grosso v. United States,
20 9
the Court stated that the required records exception applied only
when the government's purpose was "essentially regulatory," the in-
formation sought was of the type "customarily kept" by the individual,
and the records "have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at
least analogous to public documents. '210 These criteria, it has been
said, validate any subpoena for "essentially public documents such as
routine income tax forms" and for documents held by "persons en-
gaged in highly regulated industries [that] are required to be main-
201. Id. at 94.
202. Id. at 92.
203. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
204. Currently, the most heavily litigated issue in this context is whether an employee's per-
sonal writings, such as pocket calendars, are corporate records. See, e.g., United States v. Stone,
976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992).
205. In re Sealed Case, 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
206. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 32.
209. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
210. Id. at 67-68.
2005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tained as a part of a regulatory scheme."2 1' In other words,
documents of individuals are subject to subpoena under the required
records doctrine when, as in the collective entity cases, their attributes
of privacy are minimal.
The collective entity and required records exceptions come from
cases construing the Fifth Amendment. But they resonate with Fourth
Amendment concerns.212 Thus, to the extent they adhere to the pa-
rameters described above, they may provide a satisfactory benchmark
for determining when subpoenas may be based solely on relevance
and when they should be based on something more.
V. CONCLUSION
Document subpoenas are a standard criminal investigative tool to-
day. But until relatively recently these subpoenas could not be used
to obtain records from a person who could show that they would in-
criminate that individual personally and that they were neither entity
documents or "essentially" public documents required to be kept for
regulatory purposes. Although said to be mandated by the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition of compelled testimony, this showing de-
pended on the extent to which the records were personal and private.
At the same time, the Fourth Amendment, ostensibly the linchpin of
constitutional privacy protection, was pushed into the background and
thus provided minimal protection against document subpoenas,
whether addressed to third parties or to the target of an investigation,
and whether aimed at organizational or personal records. It is entirely
possible that the early twentieth century Court allowed Fourth
Amendment limitation on subpoenas to wither because it assumed
that personal records would always be well protected by the Fifth
Amendment.
211. BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-112. Even medical records might be "required," when
they are sought for the purpose of monitoring medical practice. See, e.g., In re Kenney, 715 F.2d
51. 53 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving patients' x-rays and medical records).
212. Indeed, the required records exception's emphasis on pervasive regulation parallels the
Supreme Court's administrative search jurisprudence, which allows searches of "pervasively reg-
ulated" businesses on less than probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972) ("When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to
accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and
ammunition will be subject to effective inspection."). Of course, privacy is not the only concern
in these cases. See, e.g., Robert Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amend-
ment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1987) (suggesting that the key question in required records
cases is "whether a particular reporting requirement is designed to facilitate the government's
legitimate needs for regulatory information rather than undercut the adversary system by co-
vertly aiding the investigation and prosecution of crime"). But, to a significant extent, the collec-
tive entity and required records exceptions overlap with Fourth Amendment concerns.
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Today, however, the Fifth Amendment's restrictions on subpoenas
for documents are substantially reduced, while Fourth Amendment
restrictions remain trivial. This Article has argued that this minimalist
regulatory regime is unjustifiable from a privacy perspective. At least
where personal (as opposed to organizational) documents are in-
volved, the privacy concerns evinced in earlier Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence should be rejuvenated under the aegis of the Fourth
Amendment, not-as was initially true under the Fifth Amendment-
as an absolute bar to every document subpoena in criminal cases, but
rather as a protection against demands based on mere "official curios-
ity." Further, this stronger suspicion requirement for obtaining per-
sonal data should apply to third party as well as first-party subpoenas;
the privacy interest in personal information that, to an ever increasing
extent, must be transferred to third parties in order to function in to-
day's world is not diminished simply by the fact of transfer or by the
government's avowed need for the information. In short, the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to demand that all "papers" that
contain personal information-whether held by the subject or by a
third-party institution-be afforded protection similar to that ex-
tended to the individual's house, person, and effects.
213
213. The precise contours of this protection for papers are explored in more detail in
Slobogin, supra note 9.
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